Intrusion Analysis N etwork-based intrusions have become a significant security concern for system administrators everywhere. Existing intrusion-detection systems (IDSs), whether based on signatures or statistical learning of normal behavior, give too many false positives, miss intrusion incidents, and are difficult to keep current with all known attacks. Although recent high-level correlation tools improve the quality of alerts to system administrators, 1 they have a limited success rate, tend to detect only known attack types, and ultimately generate nothing but alert messages to human administrators. As such, human experts still need to analyze each alert (and related data) to determine the attack's exact nature. Human experts are also the key tool for identifying, tracking, and disabling new attack forms. This work often involves experts from several organizations working together to share their observations, hypotheses, and attack signatures. Unfortunately, few tools help these experts with the process of analyzing log data.
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To alleviate this situation, we developed the Kerf toolkit (so-named because a "kerf " is the slit made by a saw as it cuts through a log, and Kerf is our project for processing computer logs.). Its goal is to provide an integrated set of tools that aid system administrators in analyzing the nature and extent of an attack and then communicating the results to other administrators or law enforcement agencies.
An important part of the discovery, analysis, and defense against new distributed attacks is the cooperation that occurs between experts in different organizations. Thus, Kerf contains semiautomated tools that help system administrators identify an attack's characteristics based on data from network and host-based sensors, develop a hypothesis about the attack's nature and origin, share that hypothesis with security managers from other sites, and then test the hypothesis at other sites and coordinate the testing results.
Kerf and intrusion analysis
Picture the typical system administrator, responsible for a collection of hosts on one or more subnets in an organization. Each host logs its activity using the Unix syslog facility or the Windows' Event Logging service. An IDS monitors some or all the hosts-possibly even the entire network-and generates and logs alerts about potential attacks. Once a system administrator discovers an attack, he or she must investigate it further.
Kerf is intended to assist in this investigation, called an intrusion analysis, after the attack is detected. We assume that correct and complete host and network logs are available, up to a point, because Kerf forwards encrypted log records to a secure off-host logging server. The analyst's goal is to reconstruct evidence of the attack from individual event records in the available logs.
The analysis process is inherently interactive: the sysadmin begins with a vague mental hypothesis about what happened and then uses Kerf tools to test and revise it. The process is also inherently iterative: each new piece of information lets the sysadmin revise the hypothesis and explore further. The hypothesis is alternately refined, as information that partially confirms it is discovered, and expanded, as the sysadmin tries new avenues that broaden the investigation. The result is a specific hypothesis about the attack's source and nature with concrete evidence to support it. log events, whereas Honeynet uses kernel modifications to collect and forward more in-depth information, which involves system performance and management costs that are undesirable on production systems. Also, obfuscation of both the origin and character of the logged traffic is essential to the Honeynet Project's approach, whereas we encrypt but don't disguise our traffic. Kerf 's logging host receives encrypted User Data Protocol (UDP) datagrams from its networked clients, but the logging host itself does not have an IP address. Thus, the logging host is relatively secure from conventional Internet attacks. The current implementation accepts Unix syslogs and Windows EventLogs (still under development). Users can add support for HTTPd logs, IDS events in intrusion-detection message-exchange format (IDMEF) format, and network logs, 3 or adapt our logging host to accept log data from other secure remote-logging tools.
Database. Many intrusions involve multiple hosts, and evidence of an intrusion might be spread across several logs of different types. To support fast retrieval of relevant records, the logging host stores incoming log records in a database, indexing on important fields (such as host, facility, and any IP address or username mentioned in the record). This approach also isolates the log-collection mechanism from the analysis mechanism and limits the amount of parsing, indexing, and searching that must be done within our analysis tool. The current implementation uses MySQL.
We've mentioned how Kerf can aid analysts in exam- 4 The Honeynet Project combines remote logging with encrypted packets with an IP-less gateway host much as in Kerf, but their implementation modifies the Linux kernel and stresses obfuscation of the logging mechanism's presence. 5 ining and extracting data for reporting an incident to law enforcement authorities. Although the specifics are beyond this article's scope, any such tools must be developed carefully if their results are to be admissible as evidence. An analyst can use Kerf to explore the data and then return to the original files to obtain an "original" copy as needed. To assist in this process, the logging host can record the incoming syslog records in flat files as well as the database, storing each record's file offset in the database so that records extracted from the database can be tied back to the flat file as needed.
Domain-specific query language. Given the database of log records, the analyst could use SQL queries to search for relevant records. SawQL (pronounced SAW-quill) is our extension to SQL designed specifically to express a sysadmin's hypothesis about an attack with maximum flexibility by abstracting the underlying database's schema and join semantics. SawQL is oriented toward extracting sequences of logged event records correlated either temporally or on variables corresponding to common record fields such as hostnames, IP addresses, ports, and usernames. By building these features into Kerf 's language, we hope to speed up discovery of interesting links in the data and avoid the problems inherent in using traditional tools. Such tools offer little help with organizing search results, correlating results, and suggesting new queries that organize or refine data sets.
Data organization and presentation. The centerpiece of the Kerf toolset is the Landing application, which provides the sysadmin with a graphical interface. Landing lets the user enter SawQL queries, displays their results, and lets the user provide feedback to the hypothesis engine.
Given the amount of log data collected from an organization's hosts, many queries will retrieve a large number of matching sequences. Our current implementation presents the sequence set as a set of trees and uses semantic compression to reduce the matching sequences to a set of patterns that describe those sequences. We also intend to explore other approaches.
Hypothesis engine. Given a SawQL query from the sysadmin, Kerf extracts and displays the matching sequences. Using the GUI, the sysadmin can mark each sequence as "suspicious" or "innocuous" (not all sequences need to be marked) and indicate the interesting elements of each suspicious sequence. Using any feedback provided, the engine uses algorithms drawn from the machine-learning community to suggest new queries that better fit the suspicious data, thus aiding hypothesis refinement.
This component is under development, and the full details are beyond this article's scope. When complete, the hypothesis engine will also support extrapolation and generalization.
SawQL
SawQL combines the power of relational data representation with the expressive power of a domain-specific syntax and semantics.
SawQL provides four critical extensions to SQL:
• It includes keywords to describe common features of log records, such as hostnames, IP addresses, and usernames. In our implementation, the logging host parses each incoming log record to extract these fields for the database record, so later queries can quickly extract matching records.
• It provides special syntax to express and retrieve sequences of correlated logged events, which in raw SQL would require unwieldy join constructs to describe. This improvement is essential because most attacks involve a sequence of actions that are visible as a sequence of records in one or more log files. The goal of intrusion analysis is to piece together this sequence of actions.
• It can express connections between records in a sequence, using variable names. The query-execution engine correlates log records into sequences with consistent variable bindings. The two expressions service 'adduser' AND user '%newuser' and service 'login' AND user '%newuser', when used in conjunction in a query, would match pairs of records that referred to the same user.
• It can also express the temporal relationship between records in a sequence; for example, RELTIME +/-5 minutes. The temporal proximity of two events is a critical feature in identifying some attacks. This feature also constrains the search.
When using traditional tools such as grep, the analyst must take the results of one search, extract interesting elements (such as time, username, or IP address), and run new searches on each. Manual use of the command line, or writing ad hoc scripts, can be error-prone, time-consuming, and difficult to manage. We expect that significant gains in analysts' productivity will come from alleviating these problems.
Temporal correlation is particularly important for analyzing modern network attacks, in which a sophisticated attacker is likely to conduct reconnaissance, penetration, and control (removal of penetration traces, installation of backdoors, and so on) stages from different hosts. Any hypothesis about such an attack necessarily involves an expression of the temporal proximity of these events and, thus, temporal correlation of the relevant log records. Moreover, in a distributed system with many components, a certain amount of clock skew is inevitable, and conceptually simultaneous events will have slightly varying timestamps. With SawQL, the user can conveniently mask a known small clock skew in logs by using the REL-www.computer.org/security/ ■ IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY TIME clause with a longer time interval to account for the skew.
SawQL syntax overview
A SawQL query is a sequence of one or more subqueries that describes the desired sequence of log records. A sequence of records matches the whole query if each record matches the corresponding subquery in the query, and the specified temporal relationships between matching records are satisfied. Within a subquery, each keyword describes one feature of the log record (such as a hostname or IP address) and requires one or more parameters. Each parameter can be a word or phrase (in single quotes), a regular expression, a variable name, or a comma-separated list of allowed values (lists will be supported soon).
The Kerf parser converts statements in SawQL into a set of SQL queries to run against the database.
SawQL correlation engine
SawQL lets the user correlate log entries by time (using RELTIME) or by keyword values.
Temporal correlation occurs whenever a query contains multiple subqueries. The RELTIME operator separates subqueries, expressing the maximum time between records in the sequence.
Variable correlation occurs whenever the query contains a variable name in place of a parameter's value. The variable name begins with a percent sign (%), and the variable type is defined by the keyword that precedes it (such as IPADDRESS %addr). Variables express correlations between subquery expressions. For example, when looking for all FTP accesses on any hosts accessed from the same remote IP address, (HOSTS '.*' AND SERVICE 'ftp' AND IPADDRESS %addr) RELTIME '+/-3 hours' (HOSTS '.*' AND SERVICE 'ftp' AND IPADDRESS %addr),
Kerf implements both forms of correlation in the same manner, as shown in Figure 1 's flowchart, ultimately realizing them as inner joins on temporary tables holding intermediate results.
Once the correlations are complete, the results are displayed in the form of a correlation tree with extracted log records as nodes; their placement in the tree shows their positions in the correlated sequences. We delve further into the display tree and our plans to augment it in the "Landing application" section.
SawQL examples
The following query examples demonstrate SawQL's expressive power.
Finding intrusion traces step by step. A system administrator can start with a suspicious event and, in several steps, interactively derive a query that not only describes an intrusion but can be run against logs on other sites or hosts.
Consider the syslog from www.loganalysis.org/ sections/signatures/log-hacked.html. This log corresponds to a real intrusion, and was posted without analysis. Although this example is very simple, it illustrates how the details observed in the result set lead to the next step.
First, this syslog contains records of activities by a nonroot user with user ID 0, a sign of trouble. A log-watching component of an IDS can raise an alert about them. This role could be played on our systems by a periodically scheduled set of SawQL queries that includes the following:
(HOSTS 'www' AND service 'PAM_pwdb' AND user '.*/0' AND NOT user 'root/0');
This query will flag two matching records: We list some work in the field that's related to Kerf.
Remote logging
The Unix syslog facility had long been capable of sending log records to other hosts for processing or storage, 1 but it doesn't provide a built-in mechanism for securing this data. Adding security to remote logging proved to be a nontrivial engineering problem in the real world, even with IPSec and SSH available for constructing secure tunnels. These works concentrate on either a systems or theory aspect of the problem. An intrusion specification language, for example, can't usually be directly translated into a query that can be run against a centralized database of log records. Analyst console tools don't usually provide a language that could be used to export and share an attack's descriptions.
Kerf combines the strengths of these approaches, providing at the same time a distributed infrastructure for secure logging, an analyst's GUI with a tree-based presentation of query results, and a domain-specific correlation-oriented language that is both general enough to express and share information about intrusions, and can be efficiently used directly in the console application as a query language for its correlation engine.
Kerf compared to other tools
On one level, Kerf's architecture reflects the basic necessities of log processing: parsing event records for useful features and storing these along with the record's original form in such a way that sys admins can search efficiently. However, Kerf, while making the choices discussed below, adds another level of abstraction to save the analysts' time and effort.
Parsing
Kerf attempts to automate the process of loading logs with a sysloglike format (which is highly variable and not standardized in the message part of the records)as much as possible. The difficulties of parsing a significant number of log records are often overlooked, whereas in practice this can be, and generally is, an arduous task.
Indeed, most log messages come from applications, and follow whatever format discipline can be enforced on their developers 
Related work
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The administrator can then choose to match connections from a class B network corresponding to the IPs in the log in step 2 (class C patterns yield no matches):
(HOSTS 'www' service 'useradd' AND LOGMSG 'new user' AND user 'jogja') RELTIME '-1 hour' (HOSTS 'www' IPADDRESS '203.55.*.*');
Alternatively, the administrator, having been advised of a recent ftp vulnerability, can try to ftp messages within an hour before the first suspicious user creation:
(HOSTS 'www' service 'useradd' AND LOGMSG 'new user' AND user 'jogja') RELTIME '-1 hour' (HOSTS 'www' service 'ftpd');
Either one of these queries will find the following records: which likely give the IP address of the machine used in penetration.
Notice that the administrator could pursue one line of queries for a time and then return to an earlier query and extend it differently. Keeping several branches of investigation open simultaneously is an important requirement for the GUI.
At this point, the administrator can write a query describing the attack:
(HOSTS 'www' service 'ftpd' AND LOGMSG 'FTP LOGIN REFUSED') RELTIME '+1 hour' In this case, rather than the query in the first step, the analysis' starting point could have been (HOSTS 'ids' service 'snort' AND LOGMSG 'FTP EXPLOIT') RELTIME '+1 hour' (HOSTS 'www' service 'login');
At this point, the administrator might want to check whether any users from this machine had connected to other machines while it was compromised (starting from the first ftpd attack and lasting three days).
(HOSTS 'www' service 'ftpd' AND 
Buffer overflow attack
Amd requested mount instantly (HOSTS 'zenith','happy' service 'amd' AND LOGMSG on amd followed by root logout and soon 'amq requested mount') followed by a password change RELTIME '+5 seconds'
(HOSTS 'zenith','happy' service 'PAM_pwdb' AND LOGMSG 'session closed' AND user 'root') RELTIME '+10 minutes' (HOSTS 'zenith','happy' service 'PAM_pwdb' AND LOGMSG 'password for .* changed'); Table 1 . Sample SawQL queries.
LOGMSG 'FTP LOGIN REFUSED') RELTIME '+1 hour' (HOSTS 'www' service 'useradd' AND LOGMSG 'new user' AND USER %newuser) RELTIME '+3 days' (HOSTS '*' service 'login' AND LOGMSG 'FROM www');
Other examples. Along with this example, we've collected several real intrusion logs that were either posted on the Web or sent to security mailing lists by system administrators, and wrote SawQL queries that matched the traces left by the intruders (see Table 1 ). Together, these queries illustrate most of SawQL's features.
Landing application
We implemented the Kerf user interface, called Landing, as a stand-alone Java/Swing application. Currently, Landing enables the following functionality (also depicted in Figure 2 ):
• entry of SawQL queries;
• control of query execution on the database;
• display of result sets in tree fashion with branch node labels showing the correlation and leaf nodes showing actual log lines; • automated hypothesis engine operating independently in the background while the user works, thanks to its multithreaded operation; • user feedback input, to help drive the automated hypothesis engine; • toggle controls to view the automated query or its results; • browser-style history list of previously tried queries; • cut, copy, and paste of SawQL queries; and • text output of result set.
After executing a query, Landing displays the results as a tree, with expansion buttons similar to those in many file managers. The current implementation of the tree display builds a branch node for each correlation. Nodes are labeled using pieces of the user's original query. The tree's first level corresponds to initial events of extracted sequences, and the second and deeper levels are made up by their respective correlated following events.
Within the tree display, we embed user interface elements needed for the user to give feedback about a particular log line's relevance to their current inquiry. As noted earlier, each tree node can optionally be marked relevant (suspicious) or not relevant (not suspicious), as indicated by a check or X. If the user chooses to give feedback, it is used as an input for the hypothesis engine.
Data organization and presentation
Because the typical data set used with Kerf is large, we need management tools for organizing the large number of records retrieved in response to queries. One of Kerf 's display tools automatically structures the data display by analyzing distributions of record parameters in a result set. For a large result set, we use a recursive entropy-based algorithm to split the set's records or record sequences into groups either directly (using values of their fields such as IP address or user group) or indirectly (using features computed from these fields, such as the likely IP segment of origin). As mentioned earlier, this structure is superimposed on the existing Landing correlation tree. The resulting tree has a nonuniform depth and branching factor, and reflects the original correlations. The algorithm's goal is to achieve a low maximum branching factor at each level of the refined tree. This property of the tree should simplify the following tasks, familiar to any analyst faced with a large result set:
• discovering the result set's actual composition, • understanding the distribution and ranges of selected field values in event records and finding subsets of anomalous records, • navigating to the subsets of interest, and • extracting the subsets of interest for use with another query.
An important side effect of the grouping algorithm is that it will likely separate the main bulk of results ("nor- mal" events) from the statistically anomalous rest of the distribution, which is where leads for intrusionhypothesis refinement are often found. The user can add additional levels of grouping by choosing from a list of standard features or defining custom ones, or they can directly specify how the tree should be rearranged from the top down, bypassing the grouping algorithm. In either case, the tree is rebuilt without rerunning the query by a module separate from the Kerf query engine.
We record all the user's grouping records and feature choices and save them as a classification template that can be applied to other result sets, instantiating grouping nodes to refine them for easier handling. This recording is transparent to the user, although he or she could choose to view the templates and edit them. The template language resembles XSLT, a language for transforming XML documents into other XML documents, and combines features of decision lists and classification trees.
Kerf users will notice that the simplest operations on the tree's group nodes (that is, subsets of the result set) have effects similar to those of grep ... | sort | uniq -c | sort -n or select distinct ... group by ... order by ... statements of shell and SQL environments respectively, but give the user much more flexibility in defining and connecting the filters and in keeping all the records within a common classification framework.
A simple example
Let's look at an example of reducing a flat list of records (from a simple query without correlation, on an actual Unix system log) into a manageable tree. The user is a system administrator concerned with logins from a certain ISP's network and wants a brief summary of failed and successful logins. A query for login events from *.isp.net returns some 600 records. It turned out that all logins were from two legitimate users who happened to inhabit distinct dynamic IP ranges, one of whom was prone to typos. The feature pair (user, host) was found by the entropy-based data organization algorithm to produce the best tree-form. The user was thus presented with a 12-line summarization of the 600-line result set. It also became clear that most logins came from one of these users, and his login records were further grouped by month for better presentation (shown in Figure 3 ).
Performance
We investigated the scalability of Kerf 's performance for log-message reception and processing and log line retrieval when doing correlation.
Load scalability of log message processing
We measured the performance of Kerf 's log-collection component (which comprises syslog-receiving application and the MySQL database) to discover the maximum amount of message traffic our system can handle. A computing cluster with 11 cluster nodes acted as clients, sending syslog data to the log host. The nodes were connected via gigabit Ethernet through a switch to a gateway machine, which linked them to our 100-Mbps building LAN.
CPU utilization reached a plateau at 539,352 messages per hour, with an average log message size of 74 bytes, indicating a performance limit. Both CPUs were still about 48 percent idle, proving that the log host was not CPU-bound. Measurements of network bandwidth utilization averaged about 80,000 bytes per second, which corresponds to 1/100th of the total network bandwidth available; thus, network bandwidth was not the limiting factor. Measurements of disk I/O showed write speed to the disk to be the limiting factor in performance. In particular, disk-seek times for database index writes to the disk were the primary limit on disk-write speed, even though there was unused diskbus capacity.
Although more tests are necessary to adequately map the performance of a larger range of message sizes and log host configurations, it's clear that with a server of the size and capabilities we chose, a single host performing log collection could support a fairly large collection of client machines.
Query scalability
When the Landing application is used to input SawQL, We studied SawQL queries involving variable correlation. In the variable correlation case, the number of found results to correlate is the most important factor in determining how long a query will take to resolve. This number is the intermediate result set size; it is the number of results returned by the previous, nonjoining SQL queries.
For the following query form,
(HOSTS 'tahoe' service 'ftpd' AND ipaddress=%ipaddress AND ABSTIME '11/10/02 04:00 AM, EDT', '11/30/02 06:33 AM, EDT') RELTIME '+/-0 days 1:00:00' (HOSTS 'tahoe' service sshd' AND ipaddress=%ipaddress AND ABSTIME '11/10/02 04:00 AM, EDT', '11/30/02 06:33 AM, EDT'); Figure 4 plots the total query time as the intermediate result set size grows, as well as two key components of the total query time: the time spent correlating records based on one variable, and the time spent correlating the results on time. While the time for a query does grow in a superlinear fashion, we believe it grows in a limited enough fashion to show that Kerf would be useful on large log databases-even when the analyst wants to perform the most demanding task of variable correlation on items that appear frequently in the database. The spike in the lower curve (time correlation) at the far right of Figure 4 is due to filling real memory and forcing the kernel to swap out to disk. We can alert the user that his or her query will use more than the available physical memory in future versions.
With tuning, we believe we can reduce the total query time and flatten the curves in Figure 4 . Several improvements are possible in the code that manages the correlation process (see Figure 5) . We also plan to use a newly released feature of MySQL that allows for subselects, which should let us remove the code for managing the storage of intermediate result set tables and reduce much of the associated interprocess communication time. We might also use a "RAIDb" configuration, in which the database query can be spread across multiple database engines, hosts, and disks.
Our goal is to support open-ended queries on databases that might contain many matching instances, because an analyst's initial hypothesis (query) could be quite broad. To work toward this goal, we're trying to increase system performance and provide more support in the user interface to let analysts prejudge queries' effectiveness and time to complete.
Possible vulnerabilities
This discussion wouldn't be complete without examining Kerf 's weaknesses. Most are characteristic of any remote-logging scheme.
Attackers can use several possible approaches to attack a Kerf installation. They can try to prevent log messages from reaching the central logger by creating a denial-of-service condition on the network; in particular, they can attempt to cause another machine with a Kerf transponder to emit a lot of messages with which the message relevant to ongoing penetration of the current target will have to contend. The hope here is that the important trace message will be dropped (and then deleted from the local log when penetration succeeds). Additionally, once attackers achieve user-level privileges on a Unix machine with standard syslogd, they can forge messages from any daemon using the logger utility or syslog. These two methods can be used, respectively, to deny the analyst vital information for analysis and to confuse him or her with false intrusion traces. The prospective Kerf user should be aware of these issues and account for the possibility that messages from a compromised machine might not only be masked, but also forged, and watch out for high levels of noise.
I
n the near term, we plan to extend our system to handle other kinds of logs-in particular, kernel logs such as those produced by Sun's Solaris Basic Security Module (wwws.sun.com/software/security/audit/) and Linux syscall loggers such as Snare (www.intersect alliance.com/projects/Snare/) or Syscalltrack (http:// syscalltrack.sourceforge.net/).
In the long term, a major goal of the Kerf project is to provide semiautomated tools to aid the analyst in hypothesis generation, refinement, archival, generalization, and extrapolation. To this end, we're developing a hypothesis engine, consisting of a hypothesis-generation module that assists the user in formulating the initial hypothesis; a hypothesis-refinement module, which assists the user in modifying the initial hypothesis to better target suspicious behavior; and a hypothesis-sharing module, which assists the user in taking the final hypothesis and archiving it for later use, extrapolating for other specific users and domains, and generalizing it for wider applicability.
We expect our new algorithms and tools to be a unique contribution to the current state of intrusionanalysis tools. 
